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KOSOVO IN APRIL 2003 – HEADING FOR INDEPENDENCE OR 
SLIPPING BACK TO ITS MIRROR WORLD 
 
Research Methodology 
The team consisted of five scholars: a Balkan studies historian, a historian-
anthropologist, a linguist-anthropologist, a journalist well versed in Balkan affairs, 
and an interpreter-mediator1. They represented the main body of the team already 
specialised in doing field research in the Western Balkans.  
Field work was carried out between 31 March and 7 April in the territory of 
Macedonia and Kosovo, plus a number of additional interviews, conducted in 
Bulgaria, with family members of the Bulgarian police force contingent, as well as 
with members of the UNMIK American police force contingent, which were started 
in Priština and then continued in Sofia. In May, a team member visited Gračanica, 
Kosovo, again in order to make some more inquiries. 
The aim of the study was to define the limits and chances for multiethnic co-
existence in Kosovo; to identify the zones of compatibility and incompatibility 
between the different ethnic and religious communities. We sought to analyse to what 
extent was co-existence mimicry and an effort to demonstrate tolerance – by way of 
self-adjustment to the European standards, and to what degree, an existing reality and 
a potential chance. Would it be possible in the future to expand the tolerance zones, or 
overwhelming would remain the tendency of a shrinking agreement in all spheres of 
public, social, and political life. 
  Like in all previous studies, of course, the subject of our research interest 
included: the views of the different ethnic communities, as well as of the different 
social groups, the international administration, and the peacekeeping forces, 
concerning the Albanians’ prospects and the future of the province of Kosovo.  
 The field study was carried out in Kačanik, Štrbce, Prizren, Priština, Kosovska 
Mitrovica, and Gračanica. The research strategy envisaged visiting both ethnically 
pure areas and places where at least some kind of multiethnic environment was 
present.  
 Interviewed were about 70 persons – males and females aged 17-80. The 
respondents were local residents, Albanians and Serbs, Muslims, Catholics and 
Orthodox Christians. Selected were members of all social groups – politicians, 
intellectuals, university students, hired workers, peasants, unemployed persons, 
clerics. Conducted were interviews and inquiries with members of the UNMIK police 
contingents – Bulgarians, Americans, Germans, etc., as well as with KFOR army 
personnel, of different nationalities, based in the large military camp X. near Prizren.  
 
Administration, policy, economy, society – four years later   
Quite visibly, life in the province has been normalised, especially when 
compared with the chaos and tension of the early 2000. The international 
administration is getting ready for gradually handing over the government to the local 
politicians and security forces. This is being done even by way of demonstrative acts: 
the administrative buildings have been vacated of UNMIK officers and personnel of 
other international offices in order to accommodate their local counterparts. UNMIK 
officers have been moved to specially equipped transport containers or to other 
temporary premises. 
                                                          
1 A. Zhelyazkova, V. Grigorov, D. Dimitrova, T. Mangalakova, A. Chaushi.  
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Currently, there are several officially operating police forces in Kosovo: the 
one under the UN mission (UNMIK), the military one under KFOR, the Kosovo 
Police Service (KPS), and the Kosovo Defence Corpse (TMK). 
Underway since January 2003 has been a two-year transition period during 
which the international administration is required to hand over, step by step, its 
powers to the local administration and police.  The transfer of the administrative and 
law-enforcement functions has begun from the few ethnically mixed areas, the 
international forces being expected to have only supervisory and control functions, 
and, consequently, advise the local government and correct its wrong steps. 
The first completely entrusted police station is that in the Štrpce municipality, 
a place inhabited by compact Serb population. Forthcoming in the next few months is 
the handover of the police stations in Gračanica, Kosovska Kameniica and Kosovo 
polje. In the course of this two-year period and alongside with the handover of the 
stations, the number of the international UNMIK officers, as well as the KFOR 
military contingents, should be reduced. Determined have been the percentage quotas 
by which the international presence in Kosovo is to be steadily diminished. In 2000, 
some 50 thousand KFOR troops were deployed in Kosovo, while in early 2003 their 
number was brought down to 30-25 thousand; the plans for cutting down the 
contingents envisage their number to fall down to 15 thousand by the beginning of 
2004 and, later, to as low as 7 thousand. 
As reported by our respondents – a colonel, a major and several lieutenants 
from the KFOR mission at the X. base, as well as by a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, 
and a major from UNMIK Police Station 1 – the recruitment of local personnel into 
the army and police forces is going at an extremely high rate. The Kosovo Defence 
Corpse formed in 2000 is already a contingent of 5 400, of which 1000 are women. 
They have got their own budget, planning, technical equipment, vehicles with licence 
numbers, etc. They have even a sort of military academy. These troops were largely 
employed in 2002, at the time of the earthquake that hit Gniljane. They were the first 
to arrive on the sites of disaster. They would most likely be the ones to form the core 
of the future army. 
The police forces have been recruited from among the local population – 
people with high-school education, aged between 21 and 55, psychologically and 
physically fit, both males and females. The requirement for these forces is to include 
representatives of all ethnic groups, persons having clean records and possessing valid 
ID cards issued by the UN administration.  Plans envisage that by the beginning of 
2005, when the two-year transition period will be over, the number of police officers 
will reach 7 thousand, and that of the army personnel – 5 thousand, thirty per cent of 
them expected to be of non-Albanian origin. 
At the time of our survey in Kosovo, the international police force had two 
subdivisions with specific functions: 3 300 police officers (among whom our 
respondents) served at the police stations in the municipalities and at the Central 
Headquarters; another 11 thousand, representatives of ten nations, were deployed at 
10 bases and enjoyed the status of special police forces – they live at the bases, they 
are equipped with infantry weapons and armoured vehicles, and are mobilised in 
special cases alone. They serve as guards of witnesses and magistrates involved in 
court trials, they guard buildings, they are responsible for keeping law and order 
during demonstrations and civic disturbances, they escort prisoners. 
The local police officers have taken upon themselves, almost fully, the 
responsibility of road traffic control, public order maintenance, duties on the home 
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front and in the administration. They have not yet been entrusted with criminal 
investigation functions. However, by 2005/6 only observers are to remain in Kosovo. 
While our field study was in progress, a public protest rally was staged by the 
Serbs against a proposal advanced by M. Steiner (the civilian governor of the 
protectorate) demanding the transfer of the competences of the international 
community to the newly created institutions in Kosovo. Some respondents in 
Northern Mitrovica and Gračanica explained the motives underlying their protest: 
“First of all, we are against the fact that the existent institutions are made up of 
persons who are suspects liable to The Hague Tribunal. We don’t believe that similar 
institutions are prepared to take over the government. Parliament itself has discredited 
Steiner’s idea, because everybody can see it is a discriminatory institution, which 
disregards human rights and aims to check any initiative coming from the Serb 
community or from the other minorities, they are simply dummies. Parliament has 
already proved it disrespects international law. Steiner can’t fulfill public interests 
without an agreement between Belgrade, Priština and the international community, 
without Kosovo’s status being determined. In fact, Mr. Steiner is trying, in a 
perfidious manner, to pave the way for the actual implementation and completion of 
the Albanian project for an independent state.” 
 The civilian administrators of the province have been judged quite critically 
from the very moment of the establishment of the protectorate. Kosovo’s first 
governor, B. Kouchner, was ironically dubbed Kouchneri by the Albanians 
themselves because of his weak-willed policy in making efforts to establish order in 
the province and check the aggression of the Albanians. The current governor, 
Steiner, has also compromised himself by his biased policy in favour of the Albanians 
and by his planned marriage to a local woman and wedding party arrangements. 
Steiner’s love affair with an Albanian beauty, accompanied by all sorts of gossip of 
personal and political nature, has been the most widely discussed subject among the 
international missions in Kosovo.  
The Albanians’ part in political life. On the political scene after the local 
and general elections held in Kosovo, there are three basic Albanian parties whose 
influence is disputed by no one: DLK (the Democratic League for Kosovo) headed by 
Ibrahim Rugova, DPK (the Democratic Party of Kosovo) of Hashim Thaqi, and ADK 
(the Alliance for Democratic Kosovo) led by Ramush Haradinaj. 
Highest, of course, is the popularity enjoyed by leader Rugova and his party; 
therefore, the answers given by respondents from different social strata were more or 
less alike. We asked questions about each leader’s popularity in Kačanik, in the 
village of Mušanik, in Prizren, and in Priština. The responses we got were more or 
less the same, but prejudices were maybe best formulated by three students from the 
University in Priština, Albanian Catholics, who declared beforehand they were not 
politically committed and showed little interest in the political life of the province. 
When we asked them: ”Why, after all, do you approve of Ibrahim Rugova most?”, 
they answered: “Both in the past and at this time, Rugova has always acted for the 
sake of us all rather than to his own or to his party’s political benefit. He is the only 
one who thinks in perspective, with a view to the future. All other politicians are 
focused on the present day and care about their own, personal interests alone.” To all 
interviewees Rugova still personifies not only the right type of approach applied for 
achieving Kosovo’s autonomy in the 1990s, but also the strategist who plans for the 
future of the province for decades to come. 
In consequence of our conversations on this subject in a number of different 
localities and with members of different social groups in the population, we have 
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come to the conclusion that there is strong disappointment with the politicians and 
political life in Kosovo and a process of sobering down and disillusionment with 
respect to the effectiveness of the new free and democratic political system. We have 
figured out the approximate proportions of the political leaders’ rates of approval as 
follows: some 15-18 per cent support Rugova, between 12 and 14 per cent favour 
Hashim Thaqi and over two per cent, representing the most radically-minded 
Albanians, back Ramush Haradinaj. 
Over the past year, the tensions among the three leaders have become obvious. 
The more radical Thaqi and Haradinaj have teamed up as political opponents of 
Rugova. For the first time, on 5 March 2003 official celebrations were held on the 
stadium in Priština in commemoration of “the fourth anniversary of the liberation of 
Kosovo”. There was a military parade of units of the Kosovo Defence Corpse, as well 
as of Kosovo’s newly formed police forces. Our respondents, as well as some outside 
observers, pointed out the fact that it was only Hashim Thaqi and Ramush Haradinaj, 
in the company of the guests, members of the military wings of the Albanians from 
Southern Serbia, Western Macedonia and Greece, who reviewed the troops from the 
platform. Kosovo’s president Ibrahim Rugova did not attend the official celebrations. 
Some respondents commented speculations that immediately after the review 
of the troops the guests from the different regions, together with the two Kosovar 
party leaders, held a secret meeting of the military wing during which particular 
resolutions were adopted. According to their presumptions, most urgent were the 
decisions aiming to renew the tensions in Southern Serbia and thus prevent the 
negotiations on the status of the province initiated among Priština, Belgrade, and the 
international mediators. 
TMK commander in chief, Gen. Agim Cheku, was said to have made efforts 
to mediate between the two camps and reconcile Thaqi and Haradinaj with Rugova, 
but to no avail. The friction between the political leaders obviously worried him, 
because it had been materialised in covert violence in the province ascribed to the new 
illegal Albanian National Army /ANA/, which operated not only within Kosovo, but 
also in Western Macedonia. The existing tension had made I. Rugova begin forming, 
for security reasons, his own party militia, which was expected to run up to 1000 
combatants. A similar militia force had been raised under Thaqi, who already had as 
much as 1 000 fighters, some of whom had been recruited from Albania. With the 
help of his militia troops, Thaqi sought to increase his influence in the municipalities 
of Vučitrn, Čičevica, Drenica and Kačanik. The leader of the Alliance for Democratic 
Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, too, had under his command about 900 soldiers that were 
concentrated at, and controlling, the villages in the Unič mountains and operated in 
the areas of Dakovica, Peč and Dečani. Supposedly, their task was to intimidate 
Rugova’s supporters. 
We kept asking the same question: “Who stands behind ANA?”  Our 
respondents varied in their answers, but the overwhelming opinion was that “the ANA 
troops are under the control of Ramush Haradinaj and his brother Gen. Remi, who is 
currently under arrest as suspect in one of the “generals’ cases”. It’s thought to be in 
fact a matter of rivalry between the Albanian leaders about who will take control over 
the traffic”. 
To us, as researchers, the borderline between ANA fighters and party militia 
troops was blurred, but one thing is beyond doubt in our analysis – it will become 
inevitable after the reduction in the number of peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, that 
the importance of party militias will grow and they will have a substantial influence 
on the country’s political and economic life. 
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The Koha Ditore newspaper conducted their own investigation and made 
public the following testimonies: 
N. from the village of Luka (near Dečani): “My grandson was taken ill and I 
went to seek help, although I knew one shouldn’t go out after eight in the evening. I 
was in the car with my daughter-in-law and my grandson, a neighbour was driving. 
We were stopped by five guys in soldier’s uniforms wearing black masks. They asked 
where we were going and then let us drive on. Some time later three other men 
wearing masks stopped us again, I knew one by his voice, but dared not ask anything. 
I was scared, because they were armed with Kalashnikovs.” 
I. from the same village: “Nobody’s complained of physical abuse, but in the 
villages of Luka, Požar, Ljumbard, Irsnik, Gramačel, Carabrek they would burst into 
the houses by night. In order to bully people, they sometimes shoot up in the air.” 
N.R. from the village of Gramačel: “Two guys tried to set my house on fire, 
but I threatened them I’d pay them back in the same coin. They maybe thought I 
might have recognised them and drew back, but anyway, out of anger they fired 60-70 
shots in the air. I’m a member of Rugova’s party. I even reported the incident to the 
police, although their aim was not to liquidate, but rather to threaten me. 
S. D. from the village of Carabrek: “There were three men wearing masks and 
uniforms drumming on the doors around the village, but only I bothered to lodge a 
complaint. The others were afraid. These guys move around in a jeep, they are 
organised. When we were with the Serbs, we knew whom we had to be wary of, but 
now we don’t know where the worst is to come from. Both civilian and police 
authorities in Dečani say they have no information. They have it, but they don’t care, 
they’d rather not interfere.” 
 B.S., the local leader of ADK (R. Haradinaj) in Dečani, tried to clear ANA of 
suspicion: “It couldn’t be that masked people be soldiers from this army, those are 
criminal groups. According to ANA members themselves, these are uncontrollable 
elements who are discontented with the government…” 
A.H., a member of Hashim Thaqi’s party, went even further in his 
assumptions: “There have always been collaborationists of Serbia in this area. They 
were active here during the war as they are now too…” 
The police forces in this region have got intelligence that such squads exist. 
B.B., who is the international observer for the Dečani police station, said they had got 
only second-hand information – unofficial. It was only C. who had lodged a written 
complaint, and they could undertake nothing. The police deputy chief feared those 
people were organised and had lately been expanding their operations throughout 
Kosovo. 
It is true that the margin between the Albanian politicians and the bands 
involved in political violence and trafficking is very thin That is most clearly seen in 
the widely discussed “generals’ lawsuits” against former commanders of the now 
disbanded UČK who are still looked upon as heroes of the war of liberation.  
Over 50 000 ethnic Albanians in many towns in Kosovo protested against the 
sentences passed on five members of the group of Davut Haradinaj, Ramush 
Haradinaj’s brother, who were sentenced to a total of 31 years imprisonment for 
abuses, abductions and murders of Albanians. During the war the two brothers were 
in command of UČK’s Operative Zone 6 and were among the first associates of 
Hashim Thaqi.  
After the war, Ramush Haradinaj himself became Gen. Cheku’s second-in-
command in the Kosovo Defence Corpse. During the first local elections in 2000, 
there was an assault against him. He suffered 7 or 8 injuries in it and was thereafter 
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transported on a helicopter to Germany. After his recovery, he returned home and 
formed the ADK, which is the third political force in Kosovo’s parliament. 
Proceeding at the time of our sojourn in the province was the case against 
Rustem Mustafa - Gen. Remi, accused of torturing civilian Albanians as well as of 
murdering an Albanian family of which only two children had survived. Because in 
November last year the key witness in this case was killed in a blast in the Dardania 
café, the prosecutors relied only on the testimony of the children-survivors.  
In February the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague announced they 
would require the extradition of 10 former UČK commanders some of whom are 
already party leaders, heading their own parties. Again in February, arrested and 
brought to the Hague Tribunal were the spokesman of Hashim Thaqi’s party, a war 
hero, and a general – member of Thaqi’s military staff – Fatmir Limaj (our team had 
an extensive conversation with him in 2000), as well as the commanders Hairedin 
Bala, Isak Misliu and Agim Murtezi. 
It is possible, at some point in the future, today’s active politicians – Thaqi, 
Haradinaj and Cheku, be called to account and prosecuted too. 
The Serbs and their political views. Kosovo’s Parliament consists of 120 
members and according to the electoral system put into effect the Serbs are entitled to 
10 seats; another 10 seats are distributed among the rest of the non-Albanian 
minorities in Kosovo – Turks, Gorans, Bosniaks, etc. The remaining hundred seats are 
distributed in proportion to the election results. 
Our UNMIK respondents refuted the complaints we had heard from the Serb 
interviewees in Štrpce: “Although the residents of our municipality are mostly Serbs, 
an Albanian mayor was imposed on us”. Yet, a police colonel denied their statement: 
“They have themselves to blame. They boycotted the previous elections and didn’t 
turn up. Of course, an Albanian mayor was elected and he, in turn, brought along 20 
people, Albanians, to be appointed in the municipal administration. Ten or eleven 
Serb parties took part in the latest elections and each of them won some seats, while 
the Albanians got only four votes. It’s silly, indeed, that the Serbs disperse their vote.” 
Another respondent added: “About 200 000 displaced Serbs from Kosovo 
were enabled to participate in the parliamentary elections, but they didn’t go to the 
polls at all. They boycotted, and they could’ve taken the second place in parliament, 
next to Rugova. They could’ve obtained more votes than Hashim Thaqi’s party and 
thus have stronger influence in political life.”  
So, finally, it became necessary to find out the number of Serbs left in the 
province. We heard from Serb respondents some obviously exaggerated figures – as 
many as 160 000 throughout Kosovo, a respondent from Kosovska Mitrovica telling 
us that in the municipalities in Northern Kosovo alone they numbered nearly 70 000. 
These assertions all but made an interviewee from the administration laugh; he 
assured us those figures were biased: “All Serbs in Kosovo are actually less than 65 
000. In Northern Mitrovica, including Zvečan, the Serbs are between 12 000 and 20 
000.”2 
At the office of the Coordinating Centre for Kosovo and Metohia of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, based in Gračanica, we 
talked about Kosovo’s parliament with a respondent, Member of Parliament from the 
Serb group: “We, Serbs, are only dummies, we are present there in order for people to 
                                                          
2 According to UNMIK data the population in Kosovo is between 1,800,000 and 2,400,000 people, i.e. 
300 people per sq.m., which is the highest density of population in Europe. More than 500,000 
Albanians are living in Pristina now and 170 Serbs only, while in 1999 the population in this city 
numbered 250,000 people, 40,000 of whom were Serbs. 
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say that it’s a multiethnic parliament. In reality, it functions for the sake of one nation 
alone – the Albanian. I was among the politicians who were strong supporters of the 
idea that the Serbs had to take active part in the elections. I was convinced we had to 
join parliament in order to be able to work for the reconciliation process, for human 
rights, for bringing everybody’s life back to normalcy, throughout Kosovo and 
Metohia. In a way, our parliamentary involvement is absolutely pointless – it doesn’t 
help to bring the communities closer, neither does it lead to the realization of the 
human rights project. The Parliament disrespects resolution 1244. The institution’s 
leaders are mostly Albanians who use the multiethnic parliamentary membership to 
propagandise the one-nation project of an independent state of Kosovo”. 
We asked a question about dialogue: “Isn’t it possible to talk to any of the 
Albanian leaders or MP’s?” Isn’t anyone of them at least more dialogical? Rugova, 
let’s say? Answer: “I’m sorry that, for some reasons, Rugova has probably gone out 
of the war frustrated, but his party is the most uncompromising one in pursuing the 
realization of the independence project. I don’t think we have to talk personally with 
those liable for crimes – no matter from which side they are, but we are ready to have 
talks with Thaqi’s and Haradinaj’s parties, which emerged from the former UČK, 
though talks with them are extremely difficult. The truth is that the Albanians want no 
contacts whatsoever with Serbia, while the Serbs are not willing to return without 
having any institutional relations with Serbia in place, which doesn’t mean they have 
given up their homes in Kosovo and Metohia”. 
A question from a team member: “Under what conditions would the Serbs be 
willing to return?”. A female respondent – Member of Parliament – replied: “As a 
matter of fact, UNMIK are not ready to have the Serbs back home. They know 
perfectly well that their return would mean the restoration of some Serb institutions, 
killings of Serbs by Albanian extremists, renewal of problems with Serbia. There is 
no single Serb living in Kosovo who wants us to be separated from Serbia. Much like 
in the case of the disputes between Palestine and Israel, not only that the international 
community is unwilling to have the Serbs back here, it is even not willing to keep 
home those who haven’t left.” 
The problem is that institutional discrimination inevitably leads to 
radicalization. In the 1960s, before Milosevic stepped in, there was Albanian 
domination in the administration in Kosovo and, consequently – discomfort for and 
discrimination towards the Serbs. In those years nearly 150 000 Serbs left Kosovo. 
Later on, Milosevic established institutions that discriminated the Albanians and 
deprived the ethnic Albanian community of the possibility to defend their rights at an 
institutional level. This naturally led to the strong radicalization of the Albanian 
community. 
Currently, a mirror political and social conjuncture is being shaped. The Serbs 
fear to live without any institutional protection, and the tendency with them is to 
move towards an ever more conscious and extreme radicalization. Criticisms to the 
international administration consist in that they have failed to alter the causes and 
factors underlying Kosovo’s ever recurring mirror worlds: when the Serbs dominate, 
they impose their conception of power, when the situation is reversed and the 
Albanians become dominant – they, in turn, impose their own power conception in 
which there is no place for the “others”. Based on the same mirror principle one 
community tried in the past, and the other one is trying now to survive and to feel safe 
by forming paramilitary troops, as well as parallel institutions. Kosovo has been an 
international protectorate for four years now, yet, the European administrators allow 
one ethnic community to dominate over the other and dictate the rules of living in all 
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spheres, being unable to implement if not a multiethnic pattern of co-existence, at 
least equal participation of the minorities in the government and the economy – de 
facto rather than de jure. 
A female respondent described the problem in a very conspicuous   way: “You 
can’t imagine at all how difficult and painful it is to come to know as soon as you 
were born where you belong. One cannot choose where he or she wants to be - left, 
right, or social democrat, or maybe in the center – you know this kind of thing. You 
are familiar with political division, but also with the right to have choice, however, 
there’s no political power in this place, there’s ethnic power and one has no right to 
choose. Here, in Kosovo, you come into the world a Serb and you join the Serbs, if 
you were born Albanian – then your place is with the Albanians, no nuances in 
between, and I’m sorry to say that all these multiethnic projects advanced by the 
international community have been a grey zone that has ever been doomed, lacking 
any chance, or future.” 
We came to speculate on the question of what were then the most realistic 
options for the future of Kosovo and which of the scenarios would be the most 
acceptable one for the Serbs. We suggested some alternatives and waited for the 
respondents’ answers: “Independent Kosovo with dual self-government – for either 
community, cantoning, or division of Kosovo through redrawing the country’s 
borders, or maybe any other alternative? 
The respondents, Serb politicians, summed up the projects for the future status 
in the following way: “The reality is that in Kosovo there are two major entities, 
which want to have their own governmental bodies. If some kind of federalisation is 
implemented, it will be based on the self-government of these entities. At a 
centralised level, we should have common bodies, the Serb entity would like to 
maintain close relations with Belgrade, and the Albanians – with Tirana. This won’t 
be an independent state, but it will be some long-term perspective for stabilization. 
The other alternative – division of Kosovo, would mean triggering a chain reaction – 
if a precedent is set, a divided Macedonia will follow, and one can’t say then what 
kind of developments would follow in Montenegro and Greece. Why not expect that 
to reflect on Romania, possibly on Bulgaria too, and so the processes of disintegration 
would be transferred to Europe.” 
The economy or its equivalents in Kosovo.  The economic reconstruction in 
the province is in stagnation. The large ore-dressing works of Trepča, where over 
2000 workers were formerly employed, have been closed. None of the big industrial 
enterprises has reopened. There is no official data about the rate of unemployment, 
but there is no need, because it is obvious. In Kosovska Mitrovica, for example, out of 
a total population of 130 000 in its urban and rural communities, as many as 53 300 
people are unemployed, 42 per cent of which are jobless women. 
Labour opportunities are provided mainly by the service, trade, construction, 
and transportation sectors, and by the small factories making clothes. The average 
salary is about 120-150 euros, much higher is the pay received by local people 
employed as maintenance staff or interpreters at the military bases or with the 
international administration. 
With support from some European funds, consultants and NGOs, some of the 
local businessmen and activists have been trying to set up and develop small and 
medium-sized enterprises for the production of building materials, sanitary ceramics, 
and textile. 
On the face of it, there is a widespread economic upsurge, but this illusory 
picture is due to the ongoing large-scale construction, as well as to the lively trade - 
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mainly in imported goods, because of the lacking local production. All money made, 
legally or illegally, is being invested in the construction of large houses; built are also 
a great number of new hotels and places of public resort. 
In the southern (Albanian) part of Mitrovica, we visited one of our 
respondents, who ran a small sewing shop providing employment to three women. 
The dresses and embroideries they make have a good number of women customers, 
and, what is striking for the situation in this particular town, divided by the bridge 
spanning the Ibar river, not only Albanian, but also Bosniak, Turkish and Goran 
women come into this small shop. This respondent’s business is on the brink of 
survival, because she has begun from scratch, by herself, together with a friend of 
hers, and pays a rent for the premises where the sewing machines and materials are 
placed. She dreams of expanding the production shop, of hiring at least 8-10 women, 
because she firmly believes that the Albanian women need to become emancipated 
and earn their own money, as well as be less bound to their homes and husbands.  
She told us it was impossible for her to get a bank credit, because she had 
nothing that could serve as a bank guarantee. We asked her: “We’ve seen many rich 
Albanians with obviously thriving businesses, couldn’t you borrow money from 
someone of them, under certain conditions?” The woman laughed, free-heartedly and 
loudly: “Everybody here works for his own family. No one supports anyone else. 
And, what is more, I’m a woman – no businessman would talk business with me, the 
less so money and money lending.” 
For precisely this reason perhaps a female respondent at the town’s 
municipality, a municipal councilor, told us how, using funds from some European 
projects, they had focused their efforts on women’s qualification – namely, 
dressmaker’s, hairdresser’s and beautician training courses. The municipal 
administration had worked out a project to start 9 small production firms: for 
woodwork, paste products, textile, and sanitary materials. The idea was for a greater 
number of women to become motivated not only to get employment at the future 
factories, but also to become owners, to open their own firms. The respondent we 
interviewed was president of the newly founded “Association of Businesswomen”, 
which sought to unite the efforts of women of enterprise from both sides of the 
divided city.  
Having conducted quite many interviews, we were left with the impression 
that a common administration, tax collection, registration of businesses – all are a 
fiction in this divided city, where the bridge has been turned into a high-security site, 
barred with barbed wire and sacks of sand, and guarded by heavily armed soldiers 
from the French contingent of KFOR. Communication between the northern and the 
southern part of the city is so impossible that a municipal officer makes special visits 
to the northern part, where the Serb businessmen are, in order to collect the necessary 
information and enter them in the register on the site. There are some Serbs who 
would themselves cross the Ibar with the purpose of registering their businesses – 
they are about 300 in number already, but most of them prefer to go escorted by 
UNMIK soldiers. 
The economic unsteadiness was strongly felt by the shortage of electric power 
supply. There are regular outages throughout the province and this fact has turned 
power generators into fashionable goods, they are booming outside each shop or café 
in the streets of the city. We asked some respondents about the state of electric power 
supply with certain astonishment, because it was known that electricity was imported 
from Bulgaria and from Serbia even at preferential, lower prices. In some 
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interviewees’ opinion, power shortage was caused by the resale in Italy of some of the 
cheaply purchased electricity at much higher prices. 
Naturally, part of the economy in Kosovo is linked with smuggling and illegal 
trafficking in people, narcotics, weapons and other goods. Two days before our arrival 
in Kosovo, KFOR soldiers had caught a considerable amount of weapons trafficked 
illegally from Albania through the “green” border? There is an incredible information 
deficit – this sort of data are never publicised and no member of the civil society is 
clear about who transfers the weapons from exactly where and whom it is intended 
for. The truth is that the population is not interested in this matter, because they regard 
smuggling goods as part of routine daily life.  
According to police officers, after the issuance of the special UN instruction of 
January 2001, which regulated the activity of the police and the control functions of 
the International Migrations Organisation, the situation of illegal traffic in women and 
prostitution has been constrained within certain limits. Most importantly, this 
instruction has repealed the hitherto effective legislation treating victims of traffic as 
criminals on an equal base with traffickers and procurers; it states instead that all 
trafficked individuals are considered victims. This has given the police a free hand to 
take action and, certainly, act in the name of saving hundreds of women, abducted or 
enticed into slavery.  
 In 2002 several large-scale police campaigns were carried out in Kosovo to 
check places of resort used as houses of prostitution, which did not stop procurers 
from their activity, but compelled them to legalise each girl’s job. At the moment, the 
girls work legally, with official documents and contracts, as waitresses, bar tenders, or 
dancers, and it is not so easy to hold them in captivity. 
We interviewed a police colonel, a specialist in this sphere: “A scheme has 
been created including three routes of trafficking in girls into Kosovo – through 
Serbia, through Macedonia, and through Albania. Trafficking takes place in three 
stages: the girls are recruited by means of job advertisements; afterwards they are 
transported to the three mentioned countries – the intermediate destinations, where 
they are maltreated and abused until they are bent, and, later, they are sold to other 
intermediary rings, the girls’ value varying between 3 and 5 thousand euros; the third 
stage is the transportation of the women across the Kosovo border, most often across 
the “green” border, and their resale to local agents which distribute and once again 
sell them to the places of entertainment. A striking fact is, according to investigators, 
prosecutors and police officers, that dramatically rising is the number of Albanian 
prostitutes – such were unknown until 10 years ago. Largest is the number of 
prostitutes from the Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Bulgaria. The 
prostitutes coming from Bulgaria constitute 10 per cent, 80 per cent of them being 
Roma women.” 
The Bosnian experience has shown that in provinces and states that have in the 
course of years been the arena of international peacekeeping operations or the field of 
operation of European civilian administrations and observers, trafficking in women 
and prostitution become a more profitable business than trafficking in drugs. With the 
emergence of the first places of resort functioning as houses of prostitution, special 
bans were introduced for the UNMIK police officers, as well as for the KFOR 
soldiers. All of them have been given a list of “forbidden” places they are not allowed 
to visit, places where escort girls are offered. This list is updated each month. 
Catching any officer of the international missions at some of the places on the ban list 
is sanctioned seriously and most likely leads to the recalling of the rule-breaker from 
Kosovo. In the opinion of the respondents from the international missions, these 
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measures have limited the possibility for the members of the international armed 
forces and the civilian services to get involved in relations of corruption and 
partnership with the local gangster structures. 
The Kosovar aesthetics. Albanians have traditionally been very good 
builders, that’s why the ongoing large-scale construction looks awesome. Perplexing 
is only the size and overall square surface of the houses built, although the locally 
typical large patriarchal families do need such almost monumental structures. Apart 
from this, the Kosovars have been obsessed by the “gangster-baroque” aesthetics and 
they invest all the money they earn in concrete, in “high-rise” buildings, terraces and 
an excessive number of ornaments of an obscure style.  
An inseparable part of the new architectural aesthetics is the extensive 
building of mosques. In fact, it meets the needs of the Albanian society for confirming 
all characteristics of a distinct and strong identity. The result is an ostensible 
reclericalisation finding expression in building places of worship and publishing and 
circulating religious literature. There is another tendency among the young people, 
namely to turn to religious foundations and organizations for getting employment as 
assistants or volunteers, as well as to make their educational choice from among the 
religious schools and universities. 
Our conversation with three university students, Catholics, helped us conclude 
that in the young people’s eyes to get familiar with such fields of interest and 
activities and to assess their pragmatic value is worthwhile. Getting closer to the 
religious institutions and organizations is something unknown before, something, 
which is worth trying and learning, because it might turn out practicable. Our 
observations fully corresponded with the metaphoric statement made by an Albanian 
leader, who told us several years ago that: “We are like a family in an empty house. 
We want to have in it everything other people have – tables and chairs and beds…” 
One should not overlook the severe confrontation between modernity and the 
stringent Albanian tradition, where the latter’s upholders are trying, with the help of 
religion, to maintain the satus quo, the unequivocal potestas model, and the 
patriarchal hierarchy.  
Oppressively ostentatious are the numerous monuments to the liberation war 
heroes. As a rule, those are two or three metre high obelisks or blocks of black marble 
on top of which there stands a full-length representation of the hero, “Kalashnikov” in 
hand, equipped with a whole lot of cartridge-belts and other military attributes. There 
are also the corresponding heroic inscriptions, sometimes a listing of his merits, 
sometimes pledges for carrying on the hero’s deed, as well as plenty of artificial 
flowers, even artificial brushes and small trees. This is obviously necessary as part of 
the creation and establishment of the new myths and the aesthetics of heroisation.  
Emanations of the Kosovar fashion style are works devoted to “Liberator” 
America. The Kosovar Albanians have been infatuated by the United States, while 
President Clinton has risen to the rank of a national hero. One of the main streets in 
Priština is named Bill Clinton; the name of Bill Clinton has also been given to a stone-
cutter’s and a service-station. Near to the same main street there is a Hillary café. On 
entering the city, the traveller is struck by a huge replica of the Statue of Liberty, 
overtopping absurdly the roof of the newly built Victoria Hotel.  
The local people and all our Albanian respondents are convinced that the 
Americans are the most steadfast defenders of the Albanian cause and would therefore 
back their claims for independent Kosovo. They would like the American forces to 
stay in Kosovo as long as possible, for this makes them feel secure. They were 100 
per cent supportive of the war in Iraq, although they were somewhat envious about 
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the fact that attention has been diverted from the Albanian national question and 
Kosovo’s independence over to the Middle East and the oil fields.  
During our field work there were commentaries in TV programmes and daily 
newspapers in Macedonia and Kosovo, as well as in Serbia and Bulgaria, on a 
prognosis made by professor Francisco Veiga of the University of Barcelona, that the 
U.S. has decided to find a new loyal ally on the Balkans and will therefore support the 
establishment of Greater Albania. The agitated Balkan press published some maps. 
Our team bought for 5 euros a map of Ethnic Albania, which was on sale everywhere 
in the streets of Priština. This map had spread the ethnic Albanian territories as far as 
Niš, including the whole of Southern Serbia, Western Macedonia, with the border 
lying much farther east of Skopje and Kumanovo and touching upon Veles. Of 
course, it embraced Kosovo, Albania, but also Northern Greece and Çameria 
(Thesprotia). A great portion of Montenegro, together with the Adriatic coast and the 
capital Podgorica, were also within the ethnic Albanian borders. As it seemed, poor 
Montenegrins were actually left with only Cetine and its adjacent villages. This 
paragraph is not a diversion from the subject of the corresponding section in the 
present text, but rather part of Kosovo’s geopolitical aesthetics. 
 
Public sentiments, myths and anticipations in the two major communities 
Albanians – the end of euphoria. During the past four post-war years 
something happened in the Albanian community, maybe the most tangible change 
occurred – a conflict of generations, or to put it less harshly, a growing generation 
gap. To us as analysts this fact is amazing, because we know quite well the stringent 
patriarchal character and tradition of the Albanians. The causes of the tearing up of 
the very fabric of the Albanian cultural model in such a short span of time is a 
challenge to the social anthropologist. Having collected dozens of interviews with 
men of all age groups whom we could describe in terms of family relations as four 
generations: fathers – sons – grandsons – great-grandsons, we can already make some 
assumptions.  
 It is the attitude to the present and the assessment of the past that are at the 
root of the thinning intergeneration ties. The generation   between 45 and 80 years is 
affected by certain Yugo-nostalgia, which in the case of the older people has been 
reduced to extreme mythologisation of Marshal Tito. The middle-aged generation, 
too, cherishes nice memories of the Yugoslavian past and the autonomy. Both groups 
have extremely critical attitudes to the current state of affairs in society, politics and 
the economy in Kosovo. The young generation, on their part, remember only the 
humiliation of the late 1980s and the 1990s, the underground schools, the apartheid 
under Milosevic, the radical philosophies and the accumulating hatred. They were 
involved, directly or indirectly, in the war. They are happy with the present condition 
of Kosovo and anticipate the future with optimism. 
On an early morning outside the post office in Prizren, we conversed at great 
lengths with the elderly people, from the town itself and from nearby villages, 
queuing up to get their pensions. Each of our interlocutors confirmed he was the head 
of a large family. 
A respondent from the village of Opoja: “My family consists of 15 members – 
I have three sons and a daughter. All of them live with me, along with their daughters-
in-law and the children. My sons are jobless, but they don’t want to leave for Europe 
illegally. They wait for some opportunity to seek a legal job outside Kosovo.” The 
interviewed old man had worked for three years and a half in Germany and had from 
there a pension of 45 euros. Before the war, he had received a pension of 800 dinars. 
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This information was accompanied by a remark confirmed by the other old people 
assembled in front of the post office: “Yugoslavia is no more and the pension is gone 
too. I don’t care about politics now that I can’t live on my pension. How can I live on 
45 euros, with so many people in my family who depend on me? ”  
Nevertheless, we persisted in urging him to make some political comments 
and he agreed reluctantly: “I’ve gone through three wars and I know for sure it was 
best under Marshal Tito. A great man and a big politician! Things might change for 
the better now too, but when would that be, we won’t be living to see it. Only under 
Tito people lived properly and with dignity, it’s been all shit from that time on!” 
Our respondent got excited and angry, therefore we changed the subject: “Do 
your sons know the Kanun? And their sons?” Answer: “They not only know the 
Kanun, but they also stick to it – both my children and grandchildren. I’m the head of 
the family and everybody should listen to me! Fourteen people in this family can’t 
make a single step without asking me.” Question: “Do you think this tradition will 
persist after you death?” The interviewee hesitated: “Who knows if they would obey 
the Kanun after my death. My eldest son will take my place and I believe he would 
continue running the family according to the old rules.” We revert to the political 
topic: “You now have your own parliament in Priština, don’t you expect things to 
improve, to have jobs and more chances for a better living?” His answer full of anger: 
“Kosovo’s head is KFOR, parliament can do nothing, and who knows if they want to, 
the young ones there, for they’ve lost respect for anything.” 
One of our respondents drowned us in curses and unusual aggression: “The 
state’s already gone. Here and now it’s nemechka (German ground). It’s all because 
of the Serbs. Serbia should be run over by tanks, she won’t listen to anything else. I’d 
roll tanks over Slavism anywhere. The way UČK did. (Cursing…)!” A member of the 
research team: “We are Bulgarians, there are many other Slavs beside the Serbs, we 
are different, do you hate all of us? Answer: “There’s no difference, Slavism is a 
disease, all Slavs should be done away with…!” 
Worried that we had to listen to such a tirade and wild cursing, another 
respondent from the village of Leskovac broke in: “Don’t pay attention to him, don’t 
take offence. He belongs to a most disgusting breed the war brought to light. He is a 
murderer. He killed his wife and a man, her friend. He was in prison for fifteen years 
and would’ve lain for life, but he was let out during the war together with lots of other 
convicts. He is now playing the hero – a political convict, a sufferer, he yells all the 
time, makes threats, he’s a greater extremist than any of the most extremist 
politicians.” Our tolerant respondent, too, needed infroming us: “I have a pension of 
35 euros, I barely make both ends meet. What I’m most angry with is that all around 
is chaos, everything is in mess, the Americans rule us, and we live in fear. Now in 
Kosovo it’s impossible to speak out and criticise, to say the truth of how we’re living. 
The moment they hear you, some extremists like this one appear and begin 
threatening that if you talk too much and don’t keep you mouth shut, they’d thrash 
you or send you in jail.” 
Unfortunately, there is a strange unanimity among all generations in their 
racist attitudes to and opinions of Slavicism. In the café at the Priština University we 
had a similar conversation, much calmer and sophisticated, indeed, with a student in 
literature: “I wouldn’t like to insult you, but I don’t like Slavs. I totally dislike them. 
All Slavs are the same. And Bosniaks are a disaster.” We felt we were on the track of 
the fascist-type racial theory spread throughout Kosovo, therefore, we went on with 
the interview: “Have you any prejudices as regards other nations?” Answer: “Of the 
European nations, I don’t like the Greeks, the French and the Italians.” We sought 
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support from another interviewee, student in French philology:  “We suppose you, 
studying the French culture, disagree with the views of your friend?” 
Answer: “I don’t like the French either, and the Italians as well…” All three 
interviewees summed up that if they had to choose, they would prefer the English… 
They thought there was no point at all in discussing Romany people: “The Roma are 
always with those in power, they’re rubbish”, but they did not think ill of Gorans, 
although “they are Slav Muslims and very close to the Serbs…” 
In fact, we witnessed the typical symptoms of national arrogance and self-
sufficiency. For it became clear from the students’ answers to our next questions that 
they liked most and solely all things Albanian. One of the students, who came from 
Djakovica, set out his point: “You shouldn’t ask us questions about the Kanun in 
critical light. Those are rules and laws which should be introduced everywhere in 
Europe. It’s a good Albanian experience, an age-old one, which should be adopted by 
the constitutional and legal systems in the European countries.” A scholar from the 
team: “And what about blood feud, what about the fact that it is your parents who are 
entitled to say which woman you should marry? You approve of it all and want to 
spread it throughout Europe, is that so?” Answer: “Let’s talk like realists. At the 
university, I have studied the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini thoroughly and I believe sixty 
per cent of the rules postulated in it could be applied anywhere, and if so it happens, 
the world would become a better place. Certainly, forty per cent may be discarded or 
critically revised before being applied.” Question: “At which departments is the 
Kanun studied?” Answer: “Each student in the humanities can study the Kanun as an 
optional discipline, for example at the Literature Department, also at the Faculty of 
Law.” Although they spoke as admirers of traditional law, we asked additional 
questions in order to establish how far the revolt of the young generation against 
traditions went: “Would you allow your parents to designate the woman you should 
marry, and how many children would you like to have, or would you listen to you 
parents’ advice?” The answers all students gave were of the same type: “I won’t let 
them arrange my marriage. I’d ask their opinion, of course, but I’ll choose for myself. 
The children will be two, three at the most, no matter what our parents say.” 
It is absolutely clear that obsession with the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini is part 
of the process of affirmation of the Albanian identity, part of the cult of Albanianism, 
and the core of Albanian nationalism. It is not at all a desire to strictly observe the 
prescriptions and norms the way they were observed by grandparents and parents, on 
the contrary, it is a matter of modernization and revolt against the rules, there is no 
denying. 
We continued our interviews with the students taking up the topic of the future 
status of Kosovo. We asked: “Would you like to live in some other place, do you 
consider emigrating?” Unanimous answers by several of the young people: “To me 
Kosovo is the best place in the world. Studying somewhere else – yes, but we are 
going to work in Kosovo.” The students told us that their university allowances had 
been covered by relatives who lived in Europe. The yearly academic fee is 130 euros, 
and the cost of accommodation is about 50 euros per individual. They had brothers 
and sisters working abroad and, in this connection, they made the following 
commentaries: “Our relatives working in Europe invest in us.” A literature student 
having two brothers in Germany: “They have an agreement, and one of my brothers 
sends me 200 euros each month. Even if there’s only one person working abroad, it’s 
enough – he would help.” 
A question from the team members: “Are there any fears in your life? What 
are you afraid of most?” Answer: “There’s disappointment with Thaqi and Haradinaj, 
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many people say they back and support them out of fear. If a politician speaks against 
another politician, he may be killed, but in politics it’s like that in the other parts of 
the world too.” Another young man breaks in making a topical remark: “We’re afraid 
of the war in Iraq most, because it’s possible for the American contingent to draw out 
of here. Then the Serbs will be back.” “We worry about many things – about 
unemployment, about being forced to live together with the Serbs, sometimes we fear 
that Kosovo might be divided, that some part of Kosovo might be given to Serbia.”  
One of the youths summed up judiciously:  “The truth is that both we and the 
Serbs in Kosovo still live with our illusions. We, Albanians, are waiting for 
independence, while the Serbs want Kosovo to be Serbian or something like that.” 
Question: “Imagine you fall in love with a Serb girl, what would happen then, would 
you marry her? Answer: “Should I fall in love, I would make love to her, but marry 
her – no, never!  
We also talked at great length about Macedonia, about the Albanians, 
wherever in the Balkans they live, and about Greater Albania, of course. An argument 
started among the students on the subject of whether they would fight for Greater 
Albania. The result was two to one in favour of those who were not willing to go to 
war. “If I’m supposed to defend the independence of Kosovo, I would fight in battle 
and I would give my life. But if someone decides to raise an army in the name of 
Greater Albania – I wouldn’t enlist as a volunteer, I wouldn’t sacrifice myself for 
such a cause.” And the opposite opinion expressed with pathos by a young man from 
Djakovica: “The Motherland is beautiful even if you are killed for her sake, I would 
go fighting and give my life for the ethnic Albanian boundaries. Albania’s borders 
should be those of the time of World War II – then the Albanian territory was 60 000 
square kilometres; should America help us, in less than an year and a half Kosovo’s 
status and the frontiers will be settled.” 
The men of the 40-50 age group whom we interviewed in Prizren, Kačanik 
and other places, presumed that Kosovo would be cantoned: “Write it down – we are 
going to have an independent and cantoned Kosovo.” They also believed that nothing 
depended on the parliament in Priština, that it was the U.S. and the international 
community that made the decisions. 
The young people we conversed with in Kačanik added to the theme of 
independent Kosovo the following statement: “This thing, about the independence 
status, is inevitable, because we have already settled the problem – in ten years 
Kosovo is to become the biggest state in the Balkans – with a population of 10 
million. Love with someone of another ethnic origin is not quite acceptable, it might 
be possible for a man, but for a girl to have an affair with a member of another ethnos 
– no.” They burst in a friendly laughter: “It may be acceptable, though, for us to 
marry Bulgarian, or Turkish, women. 
The village of Kačanik is a very big one – 8-10 thousand residents.  A 
countless number of children crowd the local school during the breaks. The 
Christians’ church is guarded by KFOR as are all other Christian sites in the territory 
of Kosovo. Our interviewees kept family memories of how a hundred years ago there 
were Bulgarians in Kačanik and, in this connection, they made an ironic remark 
concerning Macedonia: “There is no such state. Those living in Macedonia are 
Bulgarians, Albanians, Turks, Serbs, and Gypsies. No other people.” 
 
The Serb enclaves, the frustration and radicalization of the Serb 
community.  At the border checkpoint on entering Kosovo we met a UNMIK police 
officer who asked us different questions and, having realised that we were scholars, 
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made some comments on the situation in Kosovo. With the cynicism typical of a long 
serving and, therefore, tired soldier, he told us:  “If you want to know how the Serbs 
feel, just visit the village of Štrpce –they hang about in the pub from the morning  – 
drinking, cursing, crying, singing…” That made an impression on us and, before 
heading for Štrpce, we asked: “And what would you say about the Albanians, what do 
they do?” Answer:  “The Albanians? The Albanians make babies and that’s it… Well, 
of course they do business too. They are pragmatic. 
Štrpce is a large village – as many as 13 000 residents, the school is crowded, 
it is named “Jovan Zvijic”. The small gardens in front of the houses are cultivated, a 
mountain river flows through the village. In a central place on the façade of the 
municipal building there is a sign plate reading: “The Republic of Serbia/Autonomous 
province of Kosovo and Metohia/Skupština Štrpce”. Next to the municipal building 
there is a monument commemorating the victims of the Balkan war and World War I 
– inscribed in it are the names of all soldiers and officers who had lost their lives. 
OSCE’ s offices are accommodated in the same building. One or two KFOR 
armoured vehicles could be seen along the main street, but things had obviously been 
left to OSCE, because there were more of their automobiles. 
It goes without saying that we stopped at the tavern first; it is also situated 
right in the central part of the village, just next to the school and the municipal 
building. Not long before, we were already talking with two pensioners, who hurried 
to express their worries: “We are living as if we are under occupation. It’s not 
democracy, it’s cultural occupation. Only under Tito we had true democracy.” One of 
the pensioners, who had worked for nearly ten years in Germany, received a pension 
of 1000 euro and therefore generously treated his friends in the pub to a drink of 
cognac: “I have a good pension, but even if I got one million euro, what would I need 
it for, what would I do with it, when we live like prisoners here – we can’t go 
anywhere. I can’t travel even to Skopje and Belgrade. I can’t start a business!”  
The Štrpce municipality is part of Sirinička župa, near the border with the 
Republic of Macedonia, and includes 12 villages inhabited by Serbs. During the war, 
a numerous Serb military unit was deployed in the vicinity, and immediately after the 
withdrawal of the Serb army, the area was put under KFOR control, which protected 
the population from the UČK attacks. At present this Serb-populated enclave lives 
absolutely isolated from the neighbouring municipalities of Kačanik and Prizren, 
densely populated by Albanians. The local population maintains contacts with Serbia, 
there are passenger bus lines, Serbian newspapers are delivered daily and the elderly 
people get their pensions in dinars from Serbia. The basic monetary unit in the 
municipality is the dinar. Within the boundaries of the municipality people feel safe, 
but they are afraid to work on their fields. About 4 or 5 kilometres away from Štrpce, 
there is a well-known mountain resort – the local hotels accommodate Serbs that have 
chosen to return, but their homes are in ethnic Albanian localities and already 
inhabited by Albanians. The native residents feel depressed and cheer themselves up 
by hopes that the Serb state would be restored in the province: There will never be an 
Albanian Kosovo. Our great-grandparents lived here. This is Older Serbia, not 
Belgrade! What do we want? To live in a Serbian state, to move and work freely and 
not feel as if we are under occupation. 
The only Serb enclave immediately bordering on Serbia is situated in the 
Northern part of Kosovo – Northern Kosovska Mitrovica, Zvečan, Trepča and 
Leposavić. Half of the Serb population that has remained in the province is 
concentrated here. The status of the divided town is a special one – for example, 
goods imported from Serbia are registered and relevant custom-duties are collected 
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not at Kosovo’s administrative border, but only after they pass through the divided 
Mitrovica. The local Serbs take part in Kosovo’s political life, but they are also 
activists in Serbia. The northernmost municipalities are de facto ethnically and 
economically separated from Kosovo. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the 
Serbs in Northern Kosovo are most radically minded and convinced that whatever 
resolution is passed on Kosovo’s status, they will be able to uphold to the last their 
self-government which resembles autonomy and which, in their views, should lead to 
an independent Northern Kosovo. 
In February, the Union of the Serb Municipalities and Communities in 
KOSMET (the name used by the Serbs to designate Kosovo) was founded. We 
interviewed the leader of the Serbian National Council in Northern Mitrovica and he 
told us that the newly formed and newly elected Kosovo institutions are positively 
defined as Albanian. The Serbs are not interested in participating in them, therefore 
they trust in self-government. To them, any resolution that does not guarantee full 
self-government of the Serb communities is unacceptable and would mean 
continuation of the process of emigration of the Serbs from the province. When in 
February the Union of Municipalities was founded, i.e. an institution which in 
practice offered an alternative for the reorganization of Kosovo into two separate 
entities, M. Steiner commented that it was an attempt to establish a new parallel 
structure based on monoethnicity and directly contradicting the international 
multiethnic conception of Kosovo. Our respondent, a Serb leader, declared: “There 
isn’t any willingness on the part of the Albanians themselves for living jointly. 
According to the Albanian conception, multiethnicity means an ethnically cleansed 
society, and 90 per cent of the areas you have traveled and visited demonstrate this.” 
He also explained that their suggestions for united Serb municipalities aimed solely at 
the self-protection of the Serbs and were the only chance for bringing some of the 
refugees back to the province. 
A respondent, a chairwoman of the Association of Women in Northern 
Mitrovica, brought us to the top of a tall hill in the highest part of the urban area, 
pointed down to an entire quarter of demolished houses and said: “This is what 
multiethnic Kosovo means according to the Albanians. When the KFOR troops drew 
out, the Albanians pulled down dozens of homes of Romany people and Serbs in 
order to drive them away for good.” The Serbs from Northern Mitrovica live isolated 
from the other enclaves and travel to the other Serb-populated towns and villages on 
buses bearing special signs called “blue corridors”. Our interviewee declared: “I want 
reconciliation, but should an independent Kosovo be proclaimed, I’ll leave!” 
Lying nearby Priština is the village of Gračanica, which is divided in two – an 
Albanian and a Serb part, where about 2-3 thousand Serbs live much like in an 
enclave. Situated in this Serb enclave is the Gračanica Monastery built in the 15th 
century under King Milutin and his wife Simonida, daughter of the Byzantine 
emperor Andronikos II Palaeologus. A remarkable fact is that Gračanica is a favourite 
place where the UNMIK police officers operating in Priština rent homes. We did not 
wonder the Bulgarians preferred the Serb enclave, but we were surprised that the 
place was a kind of oasis for the American police officers. The latter offered an 
explanation: “There’s no sense to pay 800 euro for a nasty flat in the dirty Priština. 
It’s clean, quiet and tidy here and you can rent a house with a garden for 500-600 
euro.” 
We inquired other Serb activists too about what we saw as an apparent 
intention and a political perspective before them. We asked quite directly: “Aren’t 
there parallel Serb structures being set up in Kosovo and won’t this impair the process 
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of normalization of interethnic relations?” An angry radical retorted: “Let them take a 
dose of their own medicine. Haven’t they won through parallel structures, through 
paramilitary formations? It’s our turn now – we are going to make a parallel state, 
we’ll rely on Serbia the way they received assistance from Albania, we’ll also form 
our own Kosovo Serbs Liberation Army if that be the trick…” 
The same question on our part caused irritation in our female respondent, a 
Serb politician, but she answered with restraint: “Yes, such private units, supported by 
Serbia, in the sphere of health care and education do exist. But everybody should 
know these are life-saving institutions. Not a single Serb works or is a patient at the 
hospital in Priština, only Albanian is spoken at the post office, on the television too. 
The Serbs don’t go to the theatre, because the plays are performed in Albanian, it’s 
the same in the cinemas, nor do they dare use the city transport. Naturally, this made 
it necessary to open three small hospital wards for medical care in Gračanica, the Serb 
children already go to private schools where they are taught in Serbian, and some of 
them have lessons at private homes. 
Lying in the outskirts of Priština is the village of Kosovo polje, in which a 
very small number of Serbs have remained. They work at the Health Centre, which is 
under the control of the Russian international contingent. Our respondent is from the 
village of Lipljan, but he runs a tavern in Kosovo polje. It is not quite clear what 
keeps the business above water, because hardly any other customers were seen in the 
pub but Bulgarian officers or Russian soldiers occasionally droppping in. The Serbs 
that go there are as few as to gather at a single table. The interviewee related how, in 
order to supply his restaurant, he would go shopping to the Shkiptari shops under 
KFOR escort: “We’re done and over here. I’d sell my house in Lipljan, should anyone 
pay adequately. Should the Russian step out, we’re leaving too. Only 300 Serbs live 
in Priština – all of them old men and women. For now, the score is 1:1, we need 
another war…” 
It was only in the city of Prizren that the atmosphere of multiethnicity could be 
slightly felt, since ethnic Albanians and ethnic Turks when living side by side get 
along relatively well. The population in the city itself and the nearby villages runs up 
to nearly 200 000 people of whom 20 000 are ethnic Turks. We were struck by the 
fact that many of the Albanians speak the two languages – they have a good 
knowledge of Turkish. The instances of intermarriages are not rare. However, there 
are as little as 63 Serbs, while their pre-war number was 12 000. All churches in 
Prizren are enclosed, there are strict premonitory signs forbidding getting close to 
them, and they are secured by KFOR guards and armoured vehicles. On top of one of 
the hills is the “Saints Cyril and Methodius” theological school, where 10 to 12 Serb 
refugees have been hiding. Most dramatic and emblematic is the case of a married 
couple – an Albanian husband and his Serb wife: “We live against our will. We can’t 
find a shelter anywhere. It’s good we have no children.” Terror-stricken, they are 
waiting for Australian emigration visas – they want to escape as far away as possible, 
preferably to another continent. 
The refugees live on 35 euro a month: “We are like prisoners”; along the way 
to their asylum one could see graffiti reading: “We’ll kill you, nits!” 
In the St. George church built back in 1856, we met the priest who had tried to 
collect from all places possible icons that had survived - in order to save them. He 
told us: “I can’t abandon them, no matter they’re only about 60 people. It’s been four 
years now and I’m still waiting for some of them to come back, but there’s nobody. I 
travel occasionally to Belgrade, where my family lives. And it’s the fourth year in a 
row that I ride home on a tank…” 
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The fate and views of several women living in their mirror world or the 
distorting glasses of Kosovo’s political perspective 
 
Two emancipated Albanian women from the diaspora. The two Albanian 
women, about 45 years old, whom we met in Prizren, are nurses by training. When 
they were students, they took part in the 1981 demonstrations and were compelled to 
emigrate for political reasons. They had worked in Frankfurt on the Main, Germany, 
in the course of 20 years. The people of their generation emigrated most often to 
Germany, Switzerland, and the Arab countries, to Libya, for example. 
They had returned to emancipated Kosovo in order to help – but it appeared to 
them that at this point there were many uncertain things which might frustrate the 
chances of independent Kosovo: “Most of the leaders from the diaspora should come 
home and work in the concrete political situation. Although the Albanians abroad, 
anywhere around the world, work for the cause too.” 
We, as a research team, have known for several years now that the Albanian 
diaspora in Western Europe and in the United States has been one of the most 
important factors influencing the developments in Kosovo, as well as in Macedonia. 
First of all, the diaspora possesses significant financial resources, attachment to the 
family structures, and commitment to the national cause. It was in the midst of the 
diaspora that the core group of ideologists of the future of the Albanian national idea 
and the strategies for its realization was formed. In consequence of the fact that the 
members of the Albanian immigration have lived for a long time away from their 
native places, they are much less susceptible to regional disagreements and rivalries 
stemming from the level of cultural differences, identity characterisitcs, and family 
interests. Albanians’ intra-community relations are charged with similar conflicts, no 
matter where in the Balkans they have been dispersed. From the perspective of time 
and from a long distance, the Albanian diaspora can more clearly see the future 
prospects of the Albanian national and political unity.  
During the last several years the Albanian leaders living in Western Europe 
have increasingly taken the role of a driving force for the organization and funding of 
the military campaigns of the Albanians in Macedonia, Southern Serbia, and Kosovo 
itself. In the opinion of both commanders and combatants who have participated in 
armed clashes in the three regions, the important decisions concerning the military 
and political planning are produced by the Albanian national strategic center 
(traditionally called the Elders’ Council) whose headquarters have been kept secret, 
but are probably based in Germany or Switzerland. The Albanians who have taken 
part in fighting in different parts of the Balkans, say they would not have been as 
effective were it not for the considerable logistic assistance, money, weapons, 
medicines and military experts coming from abroad.  
The drawing up of plans has also been ascribed to this Albanian strategic 
center based abroad. 
In a sense, our respondents from Prizren once again confirmed everything we 
had heard until that moment, except for certain nuances and some hitherto missing 
details. In Germany, the two women are members of the Albanian National 
Democratic League (BKDSH – Beselidlya Kombetare Demokratike Shiptare), which 
was registered in Germany; it represents an association of all Albanians, not only the 
Kosovars. The league was founded in 1928 as the successor of the political ideas of 
the Prizren League of 1878. In the late 1930s it discontinued its activities and resumed 
them after the end of World War II, in Germany. It has representative offices in 
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Albania and Kosovo. At present, its formal leader in Germany is Emin Fazlia, known 
by the name of Emil Kastrioti. The League has taken care of the Albanian immigrants 
in Western Europe – accommodation, employment, etc. As for its influence in the 
province, the [two] respondents asserted that “the statutes of all Albanian parties in 
Kosovo have been borrowed from the League’s statutes, and what is more, all parties 
and many of the leaders have been trained by it”. 
Naturally, we asked them questions about their political views and intentions. 
In a nutshell, they profess several ideas: “KFOR is unable to do for Kosovo what the 
Albanians themselves, our party followers, can. The major problem is that the Serbs 
destroyed the intelligentsia in Kosovo.  Some of them emigrated and are still abroad, 
others have become Belgrade’s collaborationists. The Serbs had made life intolerable 
for almost all ethnic Albanians – we could not have meals together with the Serbs, nor 
work with them, we were separated in all spheres of everyday life. The situation today 
is better and we want to live and work here.” Question: “And what do you think of the 
status of Kosovo?” Answer: It’s too early to discuss Kosovo’s status, because the 
wound is still running and it’s impossible to consider multiethnic co-existence yet. 
One thing is definitely clear – we won’t ever allow anybody to rule us, we won’t ever 
be ordered about by anybody!” In connection with our observations, we were 
certainly interested in the views held by our interviewees concerning the possible 
unification of the ethnic Albanians: “There is a patch of land in Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, all this is Albanian land. The Albanians, too, should 
get their own.” One of the respondents stamped her foot on the ground and insisted: 
“Everybody who was born in this land has a right over it. The Albanians in 
Macedonia should also get their own. They even may not speak their own language 
there and they have both economic and political problems. I don’t mean aggressive 
acts, but given that there are problems, they should be resolved calmly and each one 
should get his own…” Question: “Is there a possibility for the unification of Kosovo 
and Western Macedonia at a certain point?” Answer: “And why not. We don’t have 
problems between us. We don’t want to take another nation’s land, we just want our 
people and our land, we want our own territory, where Albanians are present, and to 
live in peace with all other Albanians.” Question: “Yet, you obviously want 
unification of all Albanians, i.e. Greater Albania?” Answer: “The Serb propaganda 
has contrived the Greater Albania thesis. We would like to live together – all 
Albanians in one place. It would be then that the Albanians of the diaspora, who are 
now living at their homes here and abroad, would return and would help for the 
implementation of a correct policy.”  
When we talked about the Albanian traditions, we heard from them something 
that surprised us, because it fully coincided with the views held by our respondents-
students from the Pristina University: “You shouldn’t perceive the Kanun only as 
something negative – those are wise rules that have made people’s lives easier and 
have maintained order. The Kanun is great and it is currently being studied in the 
United States. It should be practiced, some of its chapters and paragraphs, while the 
negative substance should be abandoned. No matter what, be sure that God is kind to 
the Albanians. We have been visiting various places around the world for decades and 
praying in all churches for freedom, independence and unification. And God has 
heard us, because each temple is a place of worship for the Albanian – be it a church 
or a mosque.” 
 
A Serb woman from Priština and an Albanian woman from Southern 
Mitrovica looking at their destinies in the distorting mirror of “new, independent 
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Kosovo”. Both of them are beautiful and strong-minded women around 45 years of 
age. Their laughter is much the same – loud and infectious. They themselves are very 
much alike – both physically and mentally, although they are separated by a distance 
of many kilometers, by plenty of armoured KFOR equipment and numerous KFOR 
guards. They are also separated by what one of them described as follows: “Here, in 
Kosovo, your place is determined the moment you come into the world - a Serb 
belongs to the Serbs, an Albanian – to the Albanians.” Both of them do not want to 
accept this rule and are so similar in the way they think, that it is just impossible not 
to make a parallel and present them side by side. 
  
The Serb woman R.’s account:  “I spent all my life in Priština. I was with my 
parents first, then I got married, later I gave birth to my three children and brought 
them up, all in this city. I read lectures at the University, I worked as ward chief at the 
hospital. Today I can’t go freely to my house any more, I live in the X. enclave, at 
some other people’s place.3 In Priština, and in Kosovo as a whole, the international 
community has been in place for four years now and what does it matter for me and 
for my family, when I don’t even know the people who are living in my house. I don’t 
want anything exceptional but just be answered why I can’t go to my place where I 
have reared my children. Not because I’m better or worse than the Albanian women, 
not because I’m more intelligent or more stupid than they are, not because I work 
harder or lie idler, but simply because I’m a Serb woman. I’m sorry to say that after 
these four years the answer is but ethnic discrimination. Thank God, my children are 
already grown-up and independent. They study in Europe, you certainly don’t think 
that, as a mother, I could tell them: “come back here!” 
We inquired about the new army of which we had heard to be operating within 
Kosovo and Macedonia – ANA, as well as about what we had heard from the ethnic 
Albanians on the subject of Greater Albania. Our interlocutor examined the Ethnic 
Albanians Map, which we unfolded in front of her, and laughed: “Just look how far 
they have spread out! But you put the question about Greater Albania in an unwise 
way. It’s just normal for anybody [of them] to declare this to be Serbian propaganda. 
In fact, the aspiration for a new status, for a State of Independent Kosovo, is only a 
mask put on to cheat the international community, to conceal the Greater Albania 
project. The Albanians are a nation that has never been and is not willing to live with 
anyone else. Take a look around the Balkans, the ethnically purest areas are to be 
found where Albanians live. It’s the same even with resort places – the ski resort near 
Štrpce used to be visited by Serbs, and by Macedonians, but it is now crowded with 
Albanians alone; isn’t the situation in some areas of Montenegro’s Adriatic coast the 
same? Anything that has been taken under control by Albanians mustn’t be frequented 
by “others” any more.  
They make changes in everything – from changing the signs to destroying 
anything indicative of “stranger’s” presence – architecture, gravestones, and places of 
worship. 
It’s no use asking again and again about the differences between KLA, ANA,   
AOPBM,  – those are different names of the same thing. It’s not even certain that 
these armies spring up as a result of various group interests. This is rather a way of 
confusing the observers and sweeping up the traces. The same is valid of the parties. 
In order to divert the attention from the ADK and their radical positions, suddenly a 
                                                          
3 According to data of the international administration in Kosovo Albanians have settled in 77,000 
somebody else's houses, flats or other possession and more than 37,000 premises have been destroyed 
by fire. 
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new nationalist Albanian party is proclaimed – Bali Kombetar, which is active in the 
same territories – in Kosovo, in Albania, and in Macedonia, and which voices the 
same platform – unification of all Albanian territories. What’s the new then? 
I have a theory, maybe because I’m a doctor. Natality is the most primitive 
way of conquering territories. The real problem wherever Albanians live is the total 
enslavement of their wives and turning them into breeding machines. I have 
interviewed Albanian women – all of them say that after the birth of their first child 
the family demands of them to give birth, without delay, to more and more children. 
Nobody asks them if they want it, or not. It’s an absolute violation of human rights, 
trampling of their human dignity all taking place within the confines of their walled 
and shut up houses. There’s help from nowhere. As a matter of fact I feel sorry for 
them, they need support in order to get emancipated. This is the real problem, and it is 
a civilization problem.4 
The Albanians’ birthrate was taboo, a topic that was never commented on in 
Serbia and Yugoslavia. The problems were examined from all possible angles, but 
there never was a single word spoken about the emancipation, about the liberation of 
the Albanian women. It seems to me the international community now finds it 
disgraceful and impolite to discuss this issue, it is considered a racial prejudice. And 
what if a poor community has 5-6-10 children. No wonder, they can’t provide 
education for them, nor easily ensure a normal standard of living, and this brings 
about criminal behaviour. I remember my childhood years ago – we were two kids 
and our parents provided us with everything we needed. It’s quite normal to provoke 
envy when riding on a bicycle, while the neighbour’s ten kids, my peers and 
schoolmates, wonder how to still their hunger on bread alone. So a time comes when 
my neighbours turn up at my place, enraged and armed, to kill me, to rob me, to take 
all nice things I’ve got, which they haven’t. 
In a way, this overwhelming birthrate threatens the Albanians themselves, 
because there is huge unemployment, they transmit criminality to Europe – to France, 
Germany, and Sweden. Aren’t the Western societies aware of how endangered they 
are by the Albanian gangster rings and criminal activities. They are aware, of course, 
because they have their intelligence services, they have observers, and analysts like 
you. The truth is that Europe wants to create an independent Albanian state, they will 
concentrate the Albanians in one place, as in a ghetto, by promises that all will be 
integrated into the EU and Europe will be cleansed. The bad thing is that these plans 
are being made to the detriment of the Serbs and our Serb lands and homes, because 
they deprived us to produce this “black zone” in the Balkans with a nice sanitary 
cordon around.” 
The Albanian woman, F., whom we interviewed in Southern Mitrovica: “My 
parents come from Dolno Studime, they’re workers, a decent family, we’ve never 
been committed to politics. My father had some chances, he had helped Tito’s 
guerrillas, and he was offered different posts, but he didn’t accept. He also used to tell 
my brother that “politics is great trouble and one can always tarnish one’s good 
name”. That’s why I’m trying now to expand my business, I’m offered various 
European projects, but they’re all tied one way or another to politics and I wouldn’t 
like to get committed. I take a human to be a human, I don’t care about what one’s 
religion or nationality is. I also want to have knowledge of all languages, in order to 
be able to comprehend and communicate with people directly, without an interpreter. 
This is how I talk with my customers – with each woman in her own language. 
                                                          
4 The highest birthrate in Europe is registered in the province of Kosovo - 27 per mille. According to 
UNMIK data, between 55,000 and 57,000 children have been born  since 2000 in the province. 
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I spent my life in Northern Mitrovica, we had a large house and a workshop, 
and our five kids were brought up there. During the war, I thought to stay, I wanted to 
keep living along with my neighbours, but that proved to be impossible. There were 
bands that kept threatening us and we fled as far as Albania. Two weeks after the war 
was over, I went to my house and there was already a Serb family living there. They 
didn’t let me take anything of our belongings, they gave me only my kids’ pictures. 
They took away from me everything else and I keep wondering how is it possible to 
use another’s belongings, especially personal ones…  What I hated most was that I 
knew the people who had accommodated themleves in my house. I think it might’ve 
been easier for me if they were some strangers, but it was a man I had worked with 
over the years… 
I’m not one of those who keep complaining. I moved to the southern part of 
Mitrovica and started my life from scratch. I live in a rented house and it was most 
difficult for me to set up a new home – beds, coverings, chairs and so on. I love 
stylish things, things beautiful and I’ve been accustomed to a high standard. We were 
quite rich. I’m poor now, but life is still interesting. I’ve rented this premise for a 
dressmaker’s shop, and I pay 350 euro a month. I once used to work as a secretary of 
the chief of the “Smelting” division of the metallurgical works in Zvečan. Quite an 
important job I had. It was a large plant, I worked with Serbs, neighbours, colleagues. 
Dressmaking was my hobby, and now I’m living on it. Sewing has been my leisure 
pursuit for 30 years now. I had even specialised in making traditional wedding 
costumes, today they are in demand only by folk ensembles.   
I started with a single sewing machine, my sister’s, but then I realised that my 
friends and other Albanian women also needed to earn their own money in order to be 
independent. Later I made up a good project and a German organisation supported 
me. However, their requirement to me was hiring Albanian women returning from 
Germany. I didn’t mind and so I did, but now I dream of expanding my business, 
because I want to give jobs to more women who are trying to emancipate themselves. 
This is a very important issue for Kosovo – women’s emancipation. You just can’t 
imagine what it means to be closed up, dependent and all your life bear and look after 
children. 
I have five children, two of my sons are in France. I love them all, I wouldn’t 
give up anyone of them, but if I could choose, I would certainly have had fewer kids. 
Now I have the feeling that I’ve lost quite many years of my life. I have my dreams, it 
doesn’t matter that I’m older now – I want to have money, to live, to travel around the 
world, I want very much to be able to travel.  I wouldn’t like to be rich the way 
Albanians get rich nowadays. There’s something disgusting in it – they’re doing 
wholesale trade, they’re either laying up money or building huge houses. I don’t even 
know what they do with their money.  
I’ve changed a great deal after all that. I wouldn’t built a house now, I 
wouldn’t be piling up furnishings, because I already know how easy it is to lose 
everything in an instant. We, Albanians, are both Catholics and Bektashi, and me, I’m 
Muslim. I’m not a devoted believer, I know what the most important things are: don’t 
steal, don’t kill, and don’t lie.  I saw them during the war: a devout person, but 
stealing and killing. No faith teaches one to hurt others. And we all did much harm to 
each other. I’m an optimist, however, we’ll be living together again. If only the 
extremists don’t take the upper hand – they are to be found among the Albanians too, 
but more radical at the moment are the Serbs.  If only could they get to peace…” 
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Conclusion 
As in the field studies published in the two volumes of the Urgent 
Anthropology series entitled The Albanian National Problem and the Balkans, IMIR, 
2001 and Albanian Perspectives, IMIR, 2003 – the objective of the present field diary 
is, on the basis of the rich source material, to make comprehensive interdisciplinary 
conclusions without imposing the author’s opinion. 
Even so, two points stand out perfectly clear in all the interviews, inquiries 
and observations: 
- The political and social environment now witnessed in Kosovo represents, 
in a certain sense, a distorted mirror reflection of the ethnic apartheid and 
segregation of the Milosevic’s era. This will naturally lead to the gradual 
self-organization of the Serbs, isolated in several enclaves; it will make 
them radicalise their ideas and political actions, establish their own parallel 
administrative structures in the name of surviving and, in effect, struggle 
by all means against the federalization of the province. 
-  There is some tension among the three major political agents of the 
Albanian majority in Kosovo and it has led to the formation of almost 
equal in number and armament party militias exerting, by force and in a 
destructive way, their influence on political and economic life in Kosovo. 
After the eventual withdrawal of UNMIK and the reduction in the number 
of KFOR contingents, the presence of these militias as well as of the 
troops to be raised in the Serb enclaves, will become a factor that will 
undoubtedly lead to a sort of permanent guerrilla war. 
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